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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**



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***Nuclear, Space, Missile, Command and
Control Operations***

SPACE POLICY

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This Department of the Air Force Policy Directive (DAFPD) establishes Department of the Air Force (DAF) space policy; implements Department of Defense (DoD) Directive (DoDD) 3100.10, *Space Policy*; and is consistent with the National Defense Strategy and national space policies. This policy directive applies to all uniformed members of the United States Space Force (USSF), Regular Air Force, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, and civilian employees of the DAF. This directive also applies to all contractors and other organizations and individuals to the extent required by the applicable contract, binding agreement, or obligation with the DAF. This DAFPD cannot be supplemented. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in this publication adhere to Air Force Instruction 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and are disposed in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the office of primary responsibility using the DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route DAF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document has been substantially revised and should be completely reviewed. It supersedes Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 13-6, *Space Policy*, to incorporate changes in law, including establishment of the USSF, establishment of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (SAF/SQ), and reestablishment of United States Space Command (USSPACECOM).

1. Overview .

1.1. The Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF) has full authority and responsibility for both the United States Air Force (USAF) and the USSF, which exist as two separate Military Services within the DAF. The DAF provides vital space capabilities for the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), combatant commanders (CCDRs), and the Joint Force. DAF space capabilities are also vital to many United States (US) Government (USG) agencies, non-governmental and commercial entities, civilians, allies, partners, and international users. Space capabilities provide significant contributions to national prosperity and global stability. Consistent with the 2022 National Defense Strategy, the United States must remain vigilant and work across the USG, and with allies, partners, and the broader defense ecosystem to seize the opportunities of the 21st century to protect the security of the American people, expand economic prosperity and opportunity, and realize and defend American values.

1.2. Space is a warfighting domain in which a growing number of natural and artificial hazards may degrade or negate US, partner, and commercial capabilities.

1.3. Title 10 United States Code (USC) § 9081 provides for the establishment of the USSF as an armed force within the DAF. The mission of the USSF is to secure our Nation's interests in, from, and to space. The USSF is organized, trained, and equipped to provide freedom of operation for the United States; conduct space operations; and protect the interests of the United States in space. The USSF develops space forces and space capabilities for the Joint Force to protect the national interests of the United States through campaigning and by contributing to integrated deterrence in all domains. The USSF will build enduring advantages to reduce competitors' perception of the net benefits of aggression or coercion that are counter to the national interests of the United States and its allies. The USSF pursues these ends through competitive endurance, seeking to avoid operational surprise from a potential adversary and deny enemy ability to gain first-mover advantages and leverage space-enabled targeting of terrestrial forces.

2. Policy .

2.1. To enhance unity of effort across the space enterprise, the DAF will:

2.1.1. Seek opportunities to minimize classification levels, declassify, and/or eliminate the use of the classification caveat "Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals (NOFORN)" for capabilities, data, documents, and discussions except as directed by United States National Disclosure Policy, DoD, DAF, or other governing policy and guidance. Implement common data standards to strengthen alliances, attract new partners, and facilitate information sharing among USG departments and agencies, allies, international partners, and the commercial space sector. Additionally, seek to reduce programs and capabilities in special access program and special technical operations portfolios.

2.1.2. *Science and Technology.* Pursue space-related scientific and technological innovations that prioritize and balance investments in basic research, applied research, and advanced technology development across current, Force Design, and future time horizons.

2.1.2.1. Develop current state-of-the-art technology and future concepts and opportunities in efforts that may be initiated in advance of validated user requirements or programmed funding for formal acquisition.

- 2.1.2.2. Provide and maintain research facilities that enable the discovery, development, and integration of space technologies and concepts. Maintain ability to engage in expedited and operationally focused concept-through-fielding activities to support immediate and near-term needs and advance the ability of the DAF to leverage space technologies developed by other Services, allies, partners, and the commercial space sector.
- 2.1.2.3. Develop and manage an enterprise approach to operational test and training infrastructure (OTTI) comprised of a realistic, threat-relevant, and integrated architecture to achieve and sustain full-spectrum readiness. Include concepts for operating against a potential adversary enhanced by space capabilities and concepts to compensate for degraded or destroyed space capabilities into wargames, the OTTI, scenario development, experiments, and exercises at all organizational levels.
- 2.1.2.4. Promote and expand partnerships with national laboratories, academia, and the commercial space sector to exchange ideas, recruit talent, build operationally-focused research capacity, and increase space technical knowledge and skills.
- 2.1.3. *Architectures*. Develop Force Design that informs space architecture and technical integration decisions for acquiring space systems and programs. Ensure space architectures integrate with existing and approved USG, allied, partner, and commercial future architectures and capabilities to fully integrate space capabilities, missions, and data across joint and combined all-domain operations. Develop responsive concepts, techniques, and technologies for potential augmentation or rapid reconstitution of national security space enterprise (NSSE) capabilities.
- 2.1.3.1. While planning and evaluating architectures and corresponding ground systems, consider innovative approaches including, but not limited to, open architectures, data and interfaces, required performance, process improvements, training and simulation, facilities, sustainment, personnel, and affordability. Emphasize approaches that improve the ability to deter, defend, withstand, and recover from attacks in space; avoid operational surprise from potential adversaries; deny first-mover advantages; and strengthen space mission assurance (SMA) through approaches including resilience, reconstitution, defensive operations, and rapid technology refresh rates.
- 2.1.3.2. Proactively seek opportunities to cooperate with allies and other select international and commercial partners in developing and employing space architectures and capabilities that are allied-by-design, consistent with DoD and DAF guidance. Consistent with applicable laws and national security interests, take full advantage of the speed, innovation, and capabilities offered by the commercial space sector to achieve strategic advantage and support CCDR objectives during times of peace, competition, crisis, and conflict. Guiding principles for the purposeful pursuit of commercial space capabilities include: operational utility, feasibility, resilience-by-design, and speed to fielding. Institutionally and operationally integrate commercial space. Establish partnerships to expand commercial space integration.

- 2.1.3.3. Lead and participate in space architecture planning and programming activities. Provide Force Design Architecture information on priorities, plans, programs, and funding to support coordination across DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), and other USG activities.
- 2.1.4. *Acquisition.* Acquire, field, and sustain capabilities for joint, combined, interagency, and independent space operations.
- 2.1.4.1. Acquire capabilities that have been validated and prioritized through the DoD and other legislatively approved joint requirements processes and advance tailored and deliberate approaches to design, development, and affordability. Use approved alternative acquisition processes to deliver space capabilities, as appropriate.
- 2.1.4.1.1. Synchronize and integrate space, ground, and link segment development and fielding. Further, design future architectures in an open, interoperable, and iterative manner to ensure evolving capability is accounted for from program inception to allow growth and proliferation of all three segments. At program initiation, determine unique intelligence requirements, to include intelligence architecture and personnel, and ensure unique intelligence requirements are reviewed and updated throughout the systems' lifecycle. Requirements include bespoke intelligence (data, models, signatures); timeliness; and processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities.
- 2.1.4.1.2. Follow the USG Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP), consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness, to minimize orbital debris throughout all phases of the mission including initial design, development, launch, deployment, operations, end-of-life, and post-end-of-life.
- 2.1.4.1.3. Design and acquire military systems with allies and other selected international partners, where appropriate, and when such cooperation is cost-effective and improves operational capabilities.
- 2.1.4.2. Implement and utilize digital engineering on a common ecosystem to speed capability delivery, facilitate test and training, and support sustainment and modifications.
- 2.1.4.3. Execute contracting, acquisition, and programming processes to integrate commercial capabilities into hybrid space architectures. Desired end states are: leveraged commercial space capabilities to effectively enhance the application of spacepower to the Joint Force and the Nation; evolved relationships with industry, allies, and partners in a manner that extends US competitive advantage in space; and developed tools and processes to effectively inform decision making on where and how commercially available space capabilities should be integrated.
- 2.1.4.4. Pursue sustainment capabilities that will enable the DAF to enhance the ability of operational NSSE space systems to avoid, withstand, defeat, and recover from interference and attacks.
- 2.1.4.5. Throughout program lifecycle, collaborate with the IC with respect to resourcing intelligence data, personnel, and architectures. Collaborate with the IC to

enable strategic messaging, sharing activities, space policy, and space capabilities to provide strategic, operational, and tactical advantage for space. Additionally, seek opportunities to collaboratively design and acquire space systems with the IC where appropriate and when such cooperation is cost-effective and improves operational capabilities.

2.1.4.6. Collaborate with the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other relevant departments and agencies, on periodic reviews of the health and competitiveness of the US space industrial base to ensure it can continue to meet the needs of NSSE programs.

2.1.4.7. Establish a climate throughout the DAF and its acquisition workforce to provide maximum practicable opportunities for small business participation in DAF procurement and non-procurement transactions.

2.1.4.8. Leverage academia, civil, commercial, allied, and other partner space capabilities in a balanced manner to ensure the availability of space capabilities to users.

2.1.5. *Operations.* Enable independent options. Provide forces to CCDRs to deliver organic space planning and employment expertise, and space command and control focused on the combatant command's (CCMD's) operational warfighting priorities and requirements. Proactively seek to expand space-related cooperation with allies and other selected international partners by using established venues such as the Combined Space Operations initiative, the Space Chiefs Forum, and by extending US outreach to include information sharing and integrated space capabilities within the space community of interest to the maximum extent practicable consistent with applicable authorities.

2.1.5.1. Ensure that forces provided to CCMDs are able, as a part of joint and coalition operations, to provide and integrate force-multiplying space capabilities to improve the effectiveness of the Joint Force, as well as to support national, civil, international, and commercial users, as appropriate. These include capabilities to provide:

2.1.5.1.1. Space domain awareness.

2.1.5.1.2. Missile warning (launch detection), missile tracking (aerodynamic maneuverable vehicles, hypersonic vehicles), and attack assessment (impact locations, nuclear detonations).

2.1.5.1.3. Environmental monitoring.

2.1.5.1.4. Positioning, navigation, and timing for DoD, civil, allied, commercial, and civilian users.

2.1.5.1.5. Space-based communications, including support to nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3).

2.1.5.1.6. Command and control (C2) of space forces and support to joint all-domain C2.

2.1.5.1.7. Global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).

2.1.5.1.8. Protection and defense of on-orbit assets and access to the electromagnetic spectrum.

2.1.5.1.9. Nuclear detonation detection.

2.1.5.1.10. Assured access to space including mobility and logistics.

2.1.5.1.11. Space electronic warfare.

2.1.5.2. Integrate space surveillance, intelligence, and other information from academia, commercial, civil, international partner, and national security sources to develop timely and accurate space domain awareness (SDA) enabling:

2.1.5.2.1. Orbital safety; effective and efficient operations; and a sustainable, peaceful, and secure space domain.

2.1.5.2.2. Avoidance of operational surprise by a potential adversary and improved knowledge about potential adversary space capabilities that may affect joint operations in all warfighting domains.

2.1.5.2.3. Deterrence of potential adversary aggression against US interests, including aggression against space capabilities of the United States and its allies, partners, and commercial interests.

2.1.5.3. Provide the essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to operate and sustain space forces in accordance with applicable guidance and direction, including:

2.1.5.3.1. Supporting the SecDef's role as launch agent for both the defense and intelligence space sectors with assured access to space through reliable, flexible, resilient, responsive, and safe launch services by:

2.1.5.3.1.1. Maintaining and operating space launch ranges in accordance with applicable law, and DoD and DAF policies to ensure US access to the space domain.

2.1.5.3.1.2. Supporting and encouraging commercial space activities, to include enabling non-federal investment in USSF space transportation infrastructure, as authorized and appropriate.

2.1.5.3.1.3. Utilizing commercial launch services to the maximum extent possible.

2.1.5.3.2. Providing forces to conduct satellite operations for on-orbit space assets from initial deployment through end-of-life activities.

2.1.5.3.3. Conducting operational and tactical C2 of US space forces assigned or attached to a CCDR.

2.1.5.3.4. Developing tactics, techniques, and procedures that enable the use of current assets in evolutionary and revolutionary ways to assure ground-based and space-based systems' survivability and architecture resiliency.

2.1.5.4. Provide CCDRs with space forces to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy adversary capabilities to achieve space superiority at select times and places.

2.1.5.5. Ensure personnel are trained and certified in accordance with applicable directives and authorities to conduct space operations.

- 2.1.5.6. Extend the operational utility and, when appropriate, the operational lifespan of existing space capabilities through innovative ideas originating from all levels. Further develop modeling and simulation capabilities to support a realistic training environment.
- 2.1.5.7. Implement the cybersecurity principles for space systems in Space Policy Directive-5, *Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems*, and applicable DoD and DAF policies.
- 2.1.5.8. Ensure USSF forces provided to CCMDs are prepared to coordinate offensive and defensive space control operations as needed to support the CCDR's campaign plan and operations plans.
- 2.1.5.8.1. Conduct space activities in a manner consistent with US law, international law, and US policy.
 - 2.1.5.8.2. Build military-to-military relationships to enhance collective security and advance compatibility and interoperability between US and ally space systems.
 - 2.1.5.8.3. Prepare DAF air, space, and cyberspace forces to sustain effective operations against a potential adversary enabled by space capabilities, even when US space derived capabilities have been significantly degraded for extended periods of time.
 - 2.1.5.8.4. Improve capabilities to rapidly detect, track, characterize, forecast, warn, attribute, and respond to natural and man-made disturbances to US space systems.
- 2.1.6. *Environmental Protection*: Ensure environmental considerations in all USSF programs and activities are in accordance with DoD and DAF policies to include AFD 32-70, *Environmental Considerations in Air Force Programs and Activities*; include environmental compliance, risk reduction, and continuous improvement as central tenets for sustainable USSF activities.
- 2.1.7. *Safety*: Operate responsibly with due regard to space flight safety and with consideration for the well-being of the general public, DAF and support personnel, equipment, and resources. DAF space safety policy and activities will improve operational effectiveness and support mission assurance throughout the life cycle of space systems by minimizing hazards and reducing mishap risk involving space systems that result in personnel injury, property damage, system damage, destruction, or mission capability loss or delay.
- 2.1.8. *Mission Protection*: Develop and sustain the requisite processes, procedures, and resources to conduct mission protection as required given the sensitive nature of national security space programs. Implement standards defined by applicable program development requirements and security classification guidance. Employ mission protection best practices and develop new practices as necessary to support the decision-making process. Coordinate and integrate mission protection actions across the national security space portfolio. Coordinate with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations to ensure periodic threat vulnerability assessments are conducted at universities, commercial entities, and research institutions where the USSF conducts partnered activities.

2.2. The space domain, as with the air and cyberspace domains, is a core operating domain of the DAF. Space capabilities are fundamental in all phases of military operations; therefore, it is DAF policy that the USSF will:

2.2.1. Design, develop, refine, and implement Service-wide institutional strategies, policies, concepts, and doctrine for space operations; develop and refine various threat models; educate and train space forces; and contribute to and enable independent, joint, and combined forces.

2.2.2. Recruit, develop, and retain a workforce of highly skilled military and civilian space professionals who possess requisite technical expertise and who are proficient in doctrine, operations, intelligence, policy, strategy, planning, acquisitions, contracting, small business programs, managerial oversight, and leadership.

2.2.3. Embrace calculated risk, critical thinking, problem solving, and innovation to constantly expand the limits of what is possible with operational systems.

2.2.4. Incorporate space culture, capabilities, limitations, roles, missions, vulnerabilities, and threat awareness into USSF doctrine, accession training, professional military education, professional continuing education, and other training as appropriate.

2.2.5. While preparing for operations, the USSF will:

2.2.5.1. Consider risks and threats to space capabilities, consequences of their loss, and the availability of alternate means for mission accomplishment.

2.2.5.2. Develop plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures to operate with degraded space capabilities and, if necessary, defeat attacks targeted at space systems and supporting infrastructure. Assist other Services with development of plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures to operate with degraded space capabilities.

2.2.6. Strengthen space leadership through demonstration and acknowledgement of responsible behavior in space. Unless otherwise directed, conduct space operations in accordance with DoDD 3100.10 by:

2.2.6.1. Operating in, to, and from space with due regard to others and in a professional manner.

2.2.6.2. Limiting the generation of long-lived debris.

2.2.6.3. Avoiding the creation of harmful interference.

2.2.6.4. Maintaining safe separation and safe trajectory.

2.2.6.5. Communicating and making notifications to enhance the safety and stability of the domain.

2.2.7. Enhance partnership with the IC through the USSF IC Element and USSF Head of the IC Element, SF/S2, to increase unity of effort and effectiveness of space operations and space-related activities.

3. Roles and Responsibilities.

3.1. *Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (SAF/SQ).* SAF/SQ has overall responsibility for the acquisition of space systems and programs for the DAF, consistent with Title 10 USC §§ 9013-9016, and subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SecAF. SAF/SQ is responsible for, and shall oversee, all architecture and technical integration with respect to the acquisition of the space systems and programs of the Armed Forces; serves as the DAF Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) for space systems and programs; discharges assigned duties and authorities of the Senior Procurement Executive (SPE) for DAF space systems and programs; and chairs the Space Acquisition Council (SAC).

3.2. *Space Acquisition Council.* In accordance with Title 10 USC § 9021, the SAC oversees, directs, and manages acquisition and integration of space systems and programs of the Armed Forces, in order to ensure integration across the NSSE. The members of the Council are the Under Secretary of the Air Force; SAF/SQ, who acts as chair of the Council; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office; the Chief of Space Operations (CSO); and the Commander of USSPACECOM.

3.3. *Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs (SAF/IA).* SAF/IA has specific and collaborative responsibilities with USAF and USSF organizations for DAF International Programs, including development, oversight, and advocacy of DAF international policies, strategies, cooperative programs, foreign disclosure, technology transfer, and foreign military sales.

3.4. *Chief of Space Operations.* The CSO is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef, the CSO keeps the SecAF fully informed of significant military operations affecting the duties and responsibilities of the SecAF. Under the authority, direction, and control of the SecAF, the CSO: presides over the Office of the Chief of Space Operations (informally referred to as the Space Staff); transmits the plans and recommendations of the Space Staff to the SecAF; and advises the SecAF with regard to such plans and recommendations. The CSO acts as the agent of SecAF in carrying approved plans and recommendations into effect; exercises guidance, oversight, and supervision over members and organizations of the USSF; and performs other military duties assigned by US law, the President, the SecDef, or the SecAF. Pursuant to congressional and SecDef designation, the CSO serves as the Force Design Architect for space systems of the Armed Forces. The CSO works closely with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), SAF/SQ, and other Headquarters Department of the Air Force (HAF) offices, and as a member of the SAC regarding development of force laydown for the Service and short- and long-term strategies for DAF space capabilities. The CSO is responsible for certifying space policy for SecAF approval and integrating DAF equities in Joint and DoD space policies; these duties may not be delegated below the Deputy Chief of Space Operations level. The CSO also serves as the Joint Space Requirements Integrator to ensure all segments of the space architecture are optimized and designed to meet warfighter needs.

3.4.1. *The Space Staff.* The Space Staff, under the direction of the CSO, provides professional assistance to SecAF, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force, and to the CSO. The Space Staff principal officials, known as Level 2 (L2), and their staffs, will:

- 3.4.1.1. Implement this DAFPD using authorities delegated by the SecAF in applicable Headquarters Air Force Mission Directives (HAFMDs) and executed under the direction and supervision of the CSO and the oversight of designated Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force.
- 3.4.1.2. Develop plans and recommendations, implement approved plans and recommendations, and ensure intelligence requirements are addressed and resourced in parallel with program acquisition, testing, and transition to operations.
- 3.4.1.3. Ensure the entire doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTmLPP-P) framework is included in all non-Materiel solutions from inception, with focus on realistic training and simulation environments; new facilities tailored to new programs and missions; and personnel trained to operate space, link, and terrestrial segments of satellite operations.
- 3.4.1.4. In coordination with CCMDs, SAF/SQ, and SAF/IA, collaborate with interagency, international, and commercial entities to promote safe and responsible space activities. This includes sharing SDA data, space flight safety information, and contributing to the development of tenets, norms, standards, guidelines, and processes that promote responsible behavior in space.
- 3.4.1.5. In coordination with the Field Commands (FLDCOMs), develop and maintain capabilities to support the US Space Priorities Framework, including:
- 3.4.1.5.1. Maintaining a robust and responsible US space enterprise.
 - 3.4.1.5.2. Preserving the use of space for current and future generations.
- 3.4.1.6. Consistent with National and DoD space policy, and in coordination with the Director of Public Affairs (SAF/PA), publicly message which space activities the United States considers undesirable or irresponsible, and which promote stability, while enhancing relationships with allies, partners, and the commercial space sector to lead and model responsible behaviors in pursuit of normalizing these responsible behaviors.
- 3.4.2. *Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Personnel (SF/S1)*. In addition to the responsibilities listed in [paragraph 3.4.1](#), the SF/S1 will develop policies and implement programs to recruit, develop, and retain the workforce of highly skilled military and civilian space, intelligence, force modernization, and cyber professionals necessary for mission accomplishment.
- 3.4.3. *Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Intelligence (SF/S2)*. In addition to the responsibilities listed in [paragraph 3.4.1](#), the SF/S2 will develop and sustain a corps of space intelligence professionals which maintains deep knowledge of the space and counterspace capabilities of potential adversaries and effectively integrates that knowledge into all levels of USSF operations.
- 3.4.4. *Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations, Cyber, and Nuclear (SF/COO)* which contains the S3/4/6/7/10 and is known as the Chief Operations Officer (COO)). In addition to the responsibilities listed in [paragraph 3.4.1](#), the COO is responsible for:

- 3.4.4.1. Integrating operational requirements, policies, guidance, and plans to generate, provide, and sustain ready space forces in support of Joint Force Commanders.
 - 3.4.4.2. In collaboration with SAF/IA and the Chief Strategy and Resourcing Officer (CSRO), and in accordance with applicable law and policy, developing and maintaining capabilities to engage with allies, partners, and the commercial space sector across the DOTmLPF-P construct to strengthen allies and attract new partners in the space domain.
 - 3.4.4.3. As directed by the SecDef, providing forces, capabilities, and C2 architecture to support CCMD operations, activities, and investments to ensure sustained space operations; preserve US freedom of action; and reduce the effectiveness of adversaries' actions.
- 3.4.5. *Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Strategy, Plans, Programs, and Requirements* (SF/S5/8 also known as CSRO). In addition to the responsibilities listed in [paragraph 3.4.1](#), the CSRO is responsible for:
- 3.4.5.1. Delivering integrated space policies, strategies, strategic plans, and requirements to provide organized, trained, and equipped Guardians for independent options and employment by Joint Force Commanders.
 - 3.4.5.2. In collaboration with SAF/IA and the COO, and in accordance with applicable law and policy, developing and maintaining capabilities to engage with allies, partners, and the commercial space sector across the DOTmLPF-P construct to strengthen allies and attract new partners in the space domain.
 - 3.4.5.3. Aligning USSF strategy with national policy and synchronizing with CCMD operational requirements and interagency guidance.
 - 3.4.5.4. Ensuring traceability of resourcing and requirements processes with Service-level and higher echelon strategies and policies.
 - 3.4.5.5. Supporting the CSO in their roles as Force Design Architect and Joint Space Requirements Integrator to provide disciplined and strategic integration across requirements, force design, planning, and budgeting processes and ensure all segments of the space architecture are designed and optimized to meet warfighter needs.
- 3.4.6. *Field Commands*. FLDCOMs, to include component FLDCOMs at CCMDs (C-FLDCOMs), will:
- 3.4.6.1. Implement this DAFPD in collaboration with designated Space Staff offices and in accordance with official direction and guidance issued by the HAF.
 - 3.4.6.2. Ensure operational and intelligence requirements are addressed and resourced in parallel with program acquisition, testing, and transition to operations.
 - 3.4.6.3. Ensure the entire DOTmLPF-P framework is included in all non-Materiel solutions from inception, with focus on realistic training and simulation environments; new facilities tailored to new programs and missions; and personnel trained to operate space, link, and terrestrial segments of satellite operations.

3.4.6.4. In coordination with the Space Staff, develop and maintain capabilities to support the US Space Priorities Framework, including:

3.4.6.4.1. Maintaining a robust and responsible US space enterprise.

3.4.6.4.2. Preserving the use of space for current and future generations.

3.4.6.5. Consistent with National and DoD space policy, and in coordination with SAF/PA, publicly message which space activities the United States considers undesirable or irresponsible, and which promote stability, while enhancing relationships with allies, partners, and the commercial space sector to lead and model responsible behaviors in pursuit of normalizing these responsible behaviors.

3.4.7. *Commander, Space Operations Command (SpOC/CC)*. In addition to the responsibilities in [paragraph 3.4.6.](#), SpOC/CC is responsible for, in coordination with the COO and as directed by the SecDef, providing forces, capabilities, and C2 architecture to CCMDs to support CCMD operations, activities, and investments to ensure sustained space operations, preserve US freedom of action, and reduce the effectiveness of adversaries' actions.

3.4.7.1. In coordination with the COO, implementing space safety programs that uphold the highest standards for pre-launch, launch, on-orbit, reentry, and ground-based space systems safety.

3.4.7.2. In coordination with the COO, promoting responsible behaviors that contribute to a sustainable, peaceful, and secure space domain while ensuring unfettered access to space and reinforcing the inherent right to self-defense.

3.4.8. *Commander, Space Systems Command (SSC/CC)*. In addition to the responsibilities in [paragraph 3.4.6.](#), SSC/CC is responsible for:

3.4.8.1. Fielding and sustaining resilient space capabilities to meet validated requirements of CCDRs.

3.4.8.2. In coordination with the COO, implementing space safety programs that uphold the highest standards for pre-launch, launch, on-orbit, reentry, and ground-based space systems safety.

3.4.8.3. In coordination with the COO, promoting responsible behaviors that contribute to a sustainable, peaceful, and secure space domain while ensuring unfettered access to space and reinforcing the inherent right to self-defense.

3.4.9. *Commander, Space Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM/CC)*. In addition to the responsibilities in [paragraph 3.4.6.](#), STARCOM/CC is responsible for:

3.4.9.1. Developing USSF doctrine; training and exercising space forces to conduct offensive and/or defensive space operations to prevail in any warfighting domain.

3.4.9.2. In coordination with SpOC and SSC, designing, developing, and fielding OTTI to support high-end training and exercises.

3.4.10. *Commanders, C-FLDCOMs*. In addition to the responsibilities in [paragraph 3.4.6.](#), Commanders of C-FLDCOMs are responsible for:

- 3.4.10.1. Organizing, training, and exercising assigned and apportioned space forces to conduct offensive and/or defensive space operations in support of CCMD operations, activities, and investments.
 - 3.4.10.2. Identifying space capability and budget requirements to support CCMD needs in coordination with CSRO, COO, and SpOC.
 - 3.4.10.3. Developing deliberate and crisis plans to support CCMD Theater Campaign Plans and Operational Plans.
 - 3.4.10.4. Supporting CSRO and SAF/IA on ally and partner engagements focused on security cooperation for nations within respective CCMD geographic regions.
 - 3.4.10.5. Commanding and controlling assigned and apportioned space forces.
- 3.5. *USAF units currently assigned to USSF missions.* The USSF will continue to review and request unit and/or mission transfers from the USAF to the USSF, as appropriate.
- 3.5.1. *Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC).* AFMC, via the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center and Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, develops, acquires, modernizes, integrates, and supports space systems in concert with applicable acquisition organizations with space equities. Through the Air Force Research Laboratory, AFMC conducts discovery, development, and integration of warfighting technologies for space forces. Additionally, AFMC provides support to USAF units assigned to Space Force bases for functions USSF cannot provide organically (e.g., logistics, security, and medical).
 - 3.5.2. *Air Combat Command (ACC).* ACC partners with the USSF to integrate space capabilities in combat air force operations, training, and exercises in support of CCMD requirements. The USAF Warfare Center is responsible for distributed mission operations, tactical exploitation of national capabilities, and integrating with space operational testing and evaluation in coordination with STARCOM.
 - 3.5.3. *Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC).* AFRC organizes, trains, and equips space forces that can operate seamlessly when provided to the respective CCMD or military organization.
 - 3.5.4. *Air National Guard (ANG).* The ANG Directorate of the National Guard Bureau participates with and assists the states to ensure the ANG units and members are organized, trained, and equipped by the states in accordance with approved programs, policies, and guidance from the SecAF and CSO. ANG units and members can operate seamlessly when provided to the respective CCMD or military organization.

FRANK KENDALL
Secretary of the Air Force

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

10 USC § 9013, *Secretary of the Air Force*

10 USC § 9014, *Office of the Secretary of the Air Force*

10 USC § 9015, *Under Secretary of the Air Force*

10 USC § 9016, *Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force*

10 USC § 9021, *Space Acquisition Council*

10 USC § 9081, *The United States Space Force*

10 USC § 9082, *Chief of Space Operations*

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Prescribed Forms

N/A

Adopted Forms

N/A

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACC—Air Combat Command

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFMC—Air Force Materiel Command

AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive

AFRC—Air Force Reserve Command

ANG—Air National Guard

C2—Command and Control

C- FLDCOM—Component Field Command

CSAF—Chief of Staff of the Air Force

CSO—Chief of Space Operations

DAF—Department of the Air Force

DAFPD—Department of the Air Force Policy Directive

DoD—Department of Defense

DoDD—Department of Defense Directive

DoDI—Department of Defense Instruction

DOTmLPF-P—Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, policy

FLDCOM—Field Command

HAF—Headquarters Department of the Air Force

HAFMD—Headquarters Air Force Mission Directive

IC—Intelligence Community

ISR—Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
MAJCOM—Major Command
NC3—Nuclear command, control, and communications
NOFORN—Not releasable to foreign nationals
NSSE—National Security Space Enterprise
ODMSP—Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices
OTTI—Operational test and training infrastructure
SAC—Space Acquisition Council
SAE—Service Acquisition Executive
SecAF—Secretary of the Air Force
SMA—Space Mission Assurance
STARCOM—Space Training and Readiness Command
US—United States
USAF—United States Air Force
USC—United States Code
USG—United States Government
USSF—United States Space Force
USSPACECOM—United States Space Command

Office Symbols

SAF/IA—Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs
SAF/PA—Director of Public Affairs
SAF/SQ—Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration
SF/S1—Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Personnel
SF/S2—Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Intelligence
SF/COO—Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations, Cyber, and Nuclear
SF/S5/8—Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Strategy, Plans, Programs, and Requirements

Terms

Architecture—An overarching, comprehensive framework and conceptual model that facilitates the ability of DoD managers at all levels to make key decisions more effectively and efficiently through organized information sharing.

Combined Space Operations Initiative—An international partnership between Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States that recognizes the strategic importance of the space domain for economics, technology, national

security, and defense. Through the Combined Space Operations Center and the other national Space Operations Centers, the initiative helps to enable collective action to address threats and shared interests in space; advance enhanced Space Situational Awareness and data sharing; and improved operational concepts, personnel needs, and infrastructure requirements for multinational C2 of space forces.

Flight Safety—A condition of being protected from and unlikely to cause physical harm to or contact other resident space objects or terrestrial objects.

Integration (Operational)—The process of organizing, training, equipping, and employing military forces to create a force postured for unified action and that operates by engaging as a whole.

Integration (Strategic)—The process of identifying potential partnerships and/or collaboration opportunities to help fill capability gaps, increase resilience, improve interoperability, and similar activities. It also includes identifying new or improved capabilities, processes, practices, and approaches that stakeholders may not have fully considered to date. Such partnerships and opportunities should be broadly considered in the following areas: the USG, including DoD and the Interagency; in consultation with Congress; and with the commercial space sector.

Mission Protection—Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and non-military personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure. The process and conditions that protect space capabilities from harm or from acts that would compromise mission effectiveness, timing, and freedom of action. Sources of harm could be natural or artificial.

National Security Space Enterprise—The space-related systems, services, capabilities, and associated information networks of DoD and the national IC, or other space-related systems that the SecDef may designate as national security space systems in coordination with the system owner, that support US national security and enable defense and intelligence operations during times of peace, crisis, or conflict.

Resilience—The ability of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success with higher probability; shorter periods of reduced capability; and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, despite hostile action or adverse conditions. Resilience is one of the three key components of space mission assurance and is comprised of protection, proliferation, deception, diversification, distribution, and disaggregation.

Space Domain Awareness—The timely, relevant, and actionable understanding of the operational environment that allows military forces to plan, integrate, execute, and assess space operations. SDA encompasses the effective identification, characterization and understanding of any factor associated with the space domain that could affect space operations and thereby impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of our Nation.

Space Mission Assurance—A process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of space capabilities and assets, including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains that are critical to the execution of DoD mission-essential functions. Space mission assurance is enabled by defensive operations, reconstitution, and resilience.

Space Superiority—The degree of control in the space domain of one force over another that permits freedom of access and action without prohibitive interference.

Synchronization—Development, deployment, and employment of interoperable capabilities and services that enable arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.